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BREXIT, BORIS JOHNSON AND THE NOBILE OFFICIUM 
Stephen Thomson* 
Keywords: Brexit, civil procedure, constitutional law, equitable ju-
risdiction, European Union, Scotland  
 Nowhere is off limits, these days, for a discussion of Brexit.1 
Not even the pages of the Journal of Civil Law Studies are safely 
insulated from this all-pervasive subject. This report from Scotland 
discusses a petition to the nobile officium of the Court of Session—
a unique equitable jurisdiction—that almost became one of the most 
dramatic cases in UK constitutional history, and which generated 
global interest in this little used jurisdiction of the supreme civil 
court in Scotland. It was just one of the many twists and turns in the 
Brexit saga, but one that adequately demonstrated how distinctive is 
this power of the Scottish courts when contrasted with their coun-
terparts in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The main, relevant aspects of Brexit can be summarised as fol-
lows. The electorate in the referendum on the United Kingdom’s 
membership of the European Union, held on June 23, 2016, voted 
by a majority to leave the EU. On March 29, 2017, the UK2 gave 
notice to the European Council3 of its intention to withdraw from 
the EU in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
 
 *    Associate Professor, City University of Hong Kong; LL.B. (Hons.), 
LL.M. (Res.), Ph.D., Dip.L.P., University of Edinburgh. 
 1.  This portmanteau of “British” and “exit” has widely become the standard 
way of referring to the act and/or process of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal 
from the European Union. 
 2.  As required by the UK Supreme Court’s decision in R (on the application 
of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, 
the UK could only serve notice under TEU Art. 50 with parliamentary consent as 
expressed in an Act of Parliament. The European Union (Notification of With-
drawal) Act 2017 was subsequently enacted authorizing the Prime Minister to no-
tify, under TEU Art. 50, the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU. 
 3.  This shall be used as shorthand for the Council of the European Union. 
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Union (TEU).4 This triggered a two year withdrawal process that 
would mean that the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (the “Treaties”) would cease to apply to the UK on 
March 29, 2019.5 A great deal of water passed under the bridge dur-
ing those two years, especially in domestic UK politics. Notably, the 
UK Parliament enacted the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, 
which, inter alia, provided that the Withdrawal Agreement6 may be 
ratified only if parliamentary approval thereof had been obtained.7 
In the context of three failed attempts by the UK Government to 
obtain that parliamentary approval in early 2019, the then UK Prime 
Minister, Rt. Hon. Theresa May MP, twice requested an extension 
to the Article 50 period from March 29, 2019 until June 30, 2019. 
The European Council granted, on the second occasion, an exten-
sion until October 31, 2019,8 thus setting this as the new date on 
which the Treaties would cease to apply to the UK.  
 May’s repeated failure to obtain parliamentary approval for 
her negotiated Withdrawal Agreement led to her resignation as 
leader of the Conservative Party (and thus Prime Minister), with 
Rt. Hon. Boris Johnson MP winning the party’s leadership elec-
tion and thus becoming the Prime Minister on July 24, 2019. 
Johnson, who prior to his election as leader stated that he would 
take the UK out of the EU on October 31, 2019 “come what may, 
do or die,”9 came to make similar, firm statements to that effect 
after entering office. Among these were his statement on Septem-
ber 5, 2019 that he would rather be “dead in a ditch” than request 
 
 4.  Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Oct. 26. 2012, 
2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, Art. 50. [hereinafter TEU].  
 5.  TEU, supra note 4, at Art. 50(3). 
 6.  Namely an agreement (whether or not ratified) between the UK and the 
EU under TEU Art. 50—European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s.20(1) [here-
inafter EU Withdrawal Act 2018]. 
 7.  EU Withdrawal Act 2018, supra note 6, at s.13. 
 8.  European Council Decision (EU) 2019/584, Nov. 4, 2019 O.J. (L 101) 
1-3. The first extension was, pursuant to European Council Decision (EU) 
2019/476, until April 12, 2019. 
 9.  Boris Johnson and Jeremy Hunt divided over Brexit plans, BBC NEWS, 
https://perma.cc/8VM2-5FNW.  
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an extension beyond October 31, 2019;10 his letter sent on Sep-
tember 6, 2019 to Conservative Party members stating that 
“beg[ging] Brussels for an extension to the Brexit deadline . . . is 
something I will never do”;11 his claim on September 7, 2019, in 
response to a question of whether he would seek an extension if re-
quired to do so by law, “I will not. I don’t want a delay”;12 and his 
answer in an online “People’s PMQs” on September 12, 2019, in 
response to the question “Can you confirm we will leave the EU on 
31 October?,” “[I have] probably said that five times already, but [I 
am] delighted to confirm that.”13  
Set in that context, the UK Parliament enacted the European Union 
(Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019, often informally referred to as the 
“Benn Act”14 and pejoratively referred to by Johnson as the “Surrender 
Act.”15 This essentially required that, if parliamentary approval had not 
been obtained either for a negotiated withdrawal agreement or for the 
UK to leave the EU without such an agreement, in the manner pre-
scribed,16 then the Prime Minister would be required, no later than Oc-
tober 19, 2019, to seek to obtain from the European Council an exten-
sion to the Article 50 period by sending to the President of the Euro-
pean Council a letter in the form set out in the Schedule to the Act.17 
Despite Johnson’s claims that the UK Government would remain in 
compliance with its legal obligations while taking the UK out of the 
EU on October 31, 2019—claims that raised widespread speculation 
 
 10.  Boris Johnson: ‘I’d rather be dead in a ditch’ than ask for Brexit delay, 
BBC NEWS, https://perma.cc/BJA6-HHPB.  
 11.  Lanre Bakare, Boris Johnson ‘could be jailed for refusing to seek Brexit 
delay,’ THE GUARDIAN, https://perma.cc/JF79-SK5W. 
 12.  I will not seek Brexit delay, Boris Johnson insists, THE TIMES, https:// 
perma.cc/WCF7-877X. 
 13.  Brexit: government publishes Operation Yellowhammer documents—
live news, THE GUARDIAN, https://perma.cc/VM75-J8VW.  
 14.  The bill was introduced to the House of Commons by Rt. Hon. Hilary 
Benn MP. 
 15.  Henry Nicholls, PM Johnson defends use of Brexit ‘surrender act,’ REU-
TERS, https://perma.cc/T287-FFBR.  
 16.  See Cherry v Advocate General, 2019 SLT 1143, para. 22. 
 17.  European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019, s.1 [hereinafter EU 
Withdrawal Act 2019]. 
298 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12 
 
 
 
as to what stratagem the government might be intending to deploy in 
order to do so (it later transpired that there was none, or none that came 
to fruition18)—concern mounted in some quarters that Johnson 
would fail to comply with his obligations under the European Union 
(Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019. 
A petition was therefore lodged by three persons—Dale Vince 
(a businessman), Jolyon Maugham QC (a barrister) and Joanna 
Cherry QC MP (a Scottish National Party MP)—to the nobile of-
ficium of the Court of Session. The petition sought, inter alia, that 
the court would authorize and ordain its clerk to sign and send the 
extension letter, which may be required to be sent to the European 
Council should Johnson fail to do so by the end of October 19, 2019, 
as required by law.19 This thrust the nobile officium from the shad-
ows of relative obscurity—and on which this author has written the 
only text20—into the global spotlight, as this could be the means by 
which the UK formally sought an extension to its departure from the 
EU under Article 50, and by which Johnson’s insistence that the UK 
would leave the EU on October 31, 2019 would come undone. 
It is at this juncture that a brief description of the nobile officium 
must be given. The nobile officium (literally “noble office”) of the 
Court of Session (the supreme civil court in Scotland)21 is its ex-
traordinary equitable jurisdiction to award any remedy it thinks fit 
in technically narrow, but substantively wide, circumstances. As an 
equitable jurisdiction, the petitioner “comes to the court not as a 
matter of legal right, but of equitable supplication.”22 The two main 
 
 18.  Explainer: Looking for loopholes—How could Johnson avoid delaying 
Brexit?, REUTERS, https://perma.cc/344M-RQZB. The claim of legal compliance 
was also made by the Advocate General (on behalf of the UK Government) in 
Vince v Advocate General [2019] CSIH 51, para. 3. 
 19.  EU Withdrawal Act 2019, supra note 17, at s.1(3). 
 20.  STEPHEN THOMSON, THE NOBILE OFFICIUM: THE EXTRAORDINARY EQ-
UITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURTS OF SCOTLAND (Avizandum 
2015). 
 21.  The High Court of Justiciary—the supreme criminal court in Scotland—
also has a nobile officium. The UK Supreme Court does not, however, have a 
nobile officium, even though appeal may lie to it from the Court of Session. 
 22.  THOMSON , supra note 20, at 1. 
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situations in which the nobile officium has tended to be used are 
where (i) a remedy is not provided for by law, typically in excep-
tional or unforeseen circumstances,23 often characterised as a “gap” 
in the law,24 or (ii) an outcome is provided by law, but its application 
would be particularly oppressive, burdensome or unjust, in which 
case the court can disapply or mitigate the effect of an existing legal 
rule. Pertinent to the case at hand, it had also been used on a handful 
of occasions to ordain substituted authority to subscribe,25 namely 
to authorize a person, typically the Clerk of Court, to sign a docu-
ment that was legally required to be signed in place of the rightful 
signatory who was unable or unwilling to sign that document. This 
judicial power was regarded as unique to the Scottish courts—with 
no counterpart available in the courts of England and Wales, or of 
Northern Ireland—hence, the petitioners’ decision to turn to the 
Scottish courts in pursuit of their objective.26  
The petitioners had certainly been astute to identify this proce-
dural mechanism as a potential means of forcing Johnson’s hand: 
either of signing and sending the letter himself, as required by the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2019, or of having it signed and 
sent on his behalf so as to achieve the objectives of the Act. A small 
number of cases had seen the court authorize an official (usually the 
Clerk of Court) to sign on behalf of a recalcitrant person. The un-
derlying principle in such cases has been: 
[A]n intention not to permit legal processes to be obstructed 
by what are typically recalcitrant persons who have not only 
a right, but an obligation, to sign a particular document or 
instrument . . . . [T]he power may also be exercised where it 
is not certain that the rightful subscriber is refusing to sign 
 
 23.  Lord Justice-General Emslie described the existence of extraordinary or 
unforeseen circumstances as “the primary justification for the exercise of the no-
bile officium.” Anderson v HM Advocate, 1974 SLT 239, 240. See also THOM-
SON, supra note 20, at 226-228. 
 24.  Stephen Thomson, The Nobile Officium in Civil Jurisdiction: An Outline 
of Equitable Gap-Filling in Scotland, 29 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. FORUM 125 (2014). 
 25.  THOMSON, supra note 20, at 168-169. 
 26.  For a discussion of limitations on the exercise of the nobile officium, see 
THOMSON, supra note 20, at 223-252. 
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the document or instrument, but where it is nevertheless 
proving impossible to obtain subscription. In each case, the 
Court has authorised a clerk or deputy clerk of court to sign 
in place of the rightful subscriber. As such, the Court ensures 
that a practical solution is found where it would be inequita-
ble to allow an obstruction or defeat of the realization of le-
gal rights.27  
The court thus authorized the Clerk of Court to sign a discharge 
of bonds on behalf of a bondholder who refused to sign it, even in 
defiance of a court order.28 In another case it authorized the Clerk 
of Court to sign an assignation on behalf of a recalcitrant bankrupt.29 
The court has authorized the Deputy Principal Clerk of Session to 
sign a disposition of property on behalf of a person who stated in a 
letter that she would never sign such a disposition, which she sent 
alongside the unsigned disposition that had been sent for her signa-
ture.30 The court also authorized the Clerk of Court to sign a dispo-
sition on behalf of a seller who refused to do so,31 and authorized 
the Deputy Principal Clerk of Session to sign a disposition on behalf 
of a seller who had travelled to Nigeria and who could not be con-
tacted for signature.32  
These cases provided precedent33 for the court to authorize one 
of its officials to sign a document that was legally required to be 
signed, but which the rightful signatory either could not or would 
not sign. Clearly, however, the nobile officium had never been used 
to sign and send a document in place of the Prime Minister to 
 
 27.  THOMSON, supra note 20, at 169. 
 28.  Wallace’s Curator Bonis v Wallace, 1924 SC 212. 
 29.  Pennell’s Trustee, Petitioner, 1928 SC 605. 
 30.  Lennox, Petitioners, 1950 SC 546. There is a curious, if slight, resem-
blance between these facts and the conduct of Johnson, who not only stated on 
multiple occasions that he would not seek an extension from the EU, but in the 
end sent an unsigned photocopy of the extension letter to the European Council 
together with a letter explaining why his government would prefer not to have an 
extension to the Art. 50 period. 
 31.  Mackay v Campbell, 1966 SC 237. 
 32.  Boag, Petitioner, 1967 SC 322. 
 33.  Despite some judicial statements to the contrary, invocation of the nobile 
officium should not—by the very nature of the jurisdiction—require precedent. 
THOMSON, supra note 20, at 241-252. 
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formally request an extension on behalf of the UK under a provision 
in an international treaty. The nobile officium had also never been 
used in a manner that would have such spectacular political and con-
stitutional ramifications, nor had there been any reason for it to gain 
such prominent media attention, both domestically and internation-
ally. It could not, however, be said in the context of those historical 
precedents that the current petition to the nobile officium was with-
out merit. 
A petition to the nobile officium of this kind must be presented 
to the Inner House,34 namely the senior division of the Court of Ses-
sion (the junior division, from which appeals can be made to the 
Inner House, being the Outer House). The court’s judgment (dated 
October 9, 2019) stated that it would “normally be a necessary pre-
cursor to any order authorising the substitution of a signature by the 
clerk of court” that an order be obtained for specific performance of 
a statutory duty under section 45 of the Court of Session Act 1988.35 
The obtainment of such an order was not successful in a related ac-
tion, in which Johnson was deemed to accept that he must comply 
with the requirements of the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) 
Act 2019 and affirmed that he intended to do so.36 The Inner House, 
on the strength of that related judgment, effectively considered the 
current petition to be premature inasmuch as coercive measures 
should normally not be granted unless a party has already failed to 
comply with their legal obligations within the relevant timeframe. It 
noted that it was uncertain whether the statutory requirements that 
would oblige Johnson to send an extension letter to the European 
Council would be met, and the time for sending that letter (should 
he be required to do so) had not yet come.37 This petition might, 
ordinarily, be dismissed on two bases. First, there had not yet been 
any unlawfulness for the reasons of time already stated. Second, the 
 
 34.  Rules of the Court of Session, r 14.3(d). 
 35.  Vince v Advocate General, supra note 18, at para. 5. 
 36.  Vince v Johnson [2019] CSOH 77. 
 37.  Vince v Advocate General, supra note 18, at para. 8. 
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petition could be dismissed as unnecessary given the alternative 
remedies sought or potentially available in the related action (in-
cluding specific performance), noting the general principle that the 
nobile officium cannot be competently invoked where another rem-
edy is available or which was not pursued and which is no longer 
available.38 However, the court noted that should it be necessary 
for a petition to be brought afresh after the statutory deadline for 
sending the extension letter of October 19, 2019, any remedy the 
court might award could be rendered ineffective as a result of the 
passage of time (and noting that the UK could still be scheduled 
to leave the EU on October 31, 2019). The court therefore con-
tinued consideration of the petition until October 21, 2019 “by 
which time the position ought to be significantly clearer.”39  
As events unfolded, it became unnecessary for the court to 
consider whether it should exercise its nobile officium to order 
the Clerk of Court to sign and send the extension letter to the Eu-
ropean Council in place of Johnson. This is because, on October 
19, 2019, Johnson sent three letters: one (believed to be an un-
signed photocopy) to the President of the European Council seek-
ing an extension to the Article 50 period until January 31, 2020 
(in putative fulfilment of his obligations under the European Un-
ion (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019),40 a cover letter from the Per-
manent Representative of the UK to the EU to the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the European Council,41 and one (a signed letter appearing 
to be written in a personal capacity) to “Donald” (Donald Tusk, 
President of the European Council) expressing his and his gov-
ernment’s dissatisfaction with a further extension to the UK’s 
 
 38.  See THOMSON, supra note 20, at 237-241. 
 39.  Vince v Advocate General, supra note 18, at para. 12. 
 40.  Letter from Boris Johnson, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Donald Tusk, President of the European 
Council (Oct. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/H5GB-FJ9S. 
 41.  Letter from Sir Tim Barrow, United Kingdom Permanent Representative 
to the European Union to Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Secretary-General of the 
European Council (Oct. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/N54N-Q2W6. 
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withdrawal from the EU.42 The European Council subsequently 
agreed to extend the Article 50 period until January 31, 2020, 
with provision for early termination of that extension should a 
withdrawal agreement be ratified by both sides at an earlier date.43  
The petition to the nobile officium therefore became redundant, 
but its significance should not be underappreciated. This was the 
first time that the nobile officium had been petitioned against such a 
turbulent legal, political and constitutional background, and im-
portantly, it was not dismissed by the court as unmeritorious. Had 
Johnson failed to comply with his obligations under the European 
Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019, the court may well have ex-
ercised the nobile officium to ordain the Clerk of Court to sign and 
send the extension letter to the European Council on his behalf. 
There was, for a time, a real possibility of this and it was in this 
context that the nobile officium went from relative obscurity to a 
surge in national and international interest in what was this unique 
power of the Scottish courts that could force Johnson’s hand in seek-
ing an extension to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.44 Since the 
events of October, 2019, a general election was held on December 
12, 2019,45 in which Johnson’s Conservative Party won a landslide 
majority, significantly changing the parliamentary arithmetic on all 
matters Brexit. The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 
2020 was subsequently enacted for the implementation of the re-
vised Withdrawal Agreement, with the UK’s departure from the EU 
taking effect on January 31, 2020.  
The significance of the nobile officium case nevertheless en-
dures. It launched the nobile officium to stratospheric notoriety 
 
 42.  Letter from Boris Johnson, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Donald Tusk, President of the European 
Council (Oct. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/V6XP-LF97.  
 43.  Decision EUCO XT 20024/2/19 REV 2. 
 44.  See, e.g., Reevel Alderson, What is the nobile officium?, BBC NEWS, 
https://perma.cc/TJ66-EW69 and Kieran Andrews, Legal Bid to Force Boris 
Johnson to Delay Brexit, THE TIMES, https://perma.cc/RD75-FAGZ. 
 45.  Legal provision for this election was made in the Early Parliamentary 
General Election Act 2019, effective October 31, 2019. 
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relative to its previous, quiet existence. There is now such awareness 
of the jurisdiction and its highly versatile potential applications that 
it may in future attract more petitions than the handful submitted 
each year. The first Deputy President of the UK Supreme Court, 
Lord Hope of Craighead, wrote in the foreword to this author’s text 
on the nobile officium that it “needs to be invoked wherever it is 
needed to prevent injustice, and the courts need to be encouraged to 
use it.”46 This author has also encouraged practitioners to use it, and 
to use it properly.47 It is probably safe to say that no one envisaged 
that the nobile officium would (almost) be used to such dramatic ef-
fect as in this case, and the publicity surrounding the case may pro-
vide the catalyst for that encouragement. It also shows that equitable 
jurisdiction, sometimes written off as an obscure backwater of the 
legal consciousness, can be thrust onto centre stage when the occa-
sion arises, and that it can serve a distinct purpose that is not served 
by ordinary legal jurisdiction.  
 The fact that the petitioners turned to the courts of Scotland for 
resort to this unique judicial power, and not to those elsewhere in 
the UK which do not enjoy such a power, is further evidence of the 
practical implications of Scotland’s distinct legal system. The Scot-
tish jurist Lord Kames wrote that there was growing in the Court of 
Session a jurisdiction which “will probably in time produce a gen-
eral maxim, that it is the province of [the court], to redress all wrongs 
for which no other remedy is provided.”48 That has been especially 
evident in the court’s nobile officium, and it is a testament to the 
continuing utility of that high equitable jurisdiction that the petition-
ers sought to effect the Prime Minister’s statutory obligations, not in 
England, Wales or Northern Ireland, but in Scotland. 
 
 
 46.  See THOMSON, supra note 20, at x. 
 47.  Stephen Thomson, The Nobile Officium: Still Relevant, Still Useful, THE 
JOURNAL OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF SCOTLAND, available at https://perma 
.cc/P9US-96VW. 
 48.  HENRY HOME, HISTORICAL LAW TRACTS 228-229 (4th ed., Bell & Brad-
fute 1817). 
